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Questions > Identity Cards Written Questions
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From House of Commons Hansard

1) Mr. Khan: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what assessment he has made of the accuracy of biometric readings. [4137]

Mr. McNulty: We have taken a number of steps to assess the accuracy of biometric readings. We have closely reviewed leading scientific evidence in the field; consulted with biometric experts from academia and industry; sought to build on the experience and knowledge of other organisations, such as IND, PITO and Communications-Electronic Security Group's (CESG's) biometric readings group and we have conducted a review of the experiences of other examples of biometric systems, including systems holding millions of sample records. Current thinking is that three separate biometrics will be recorded (iris image; fingerprints and facial recognition) which would increase the accuracy of biometric readings from individuals. In addition, we will keep emerging research in this field under constant review and it is envisaged we will hold performance tests during procurement and the early phase of implementation of the ID card scheme.

2) Mr. Khan: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what plans he has to issue identity cards to newly arrived asylum seekers. [4146]

Mr. McNulty: There are no plans to issue newly arrived asylum seekers with Identity Cards as it is difficult to check the biographical footprint of asylum seekers as they arrive in the UK without any documents to confirm their identity. Asylum seekers are issued with biometric Asylum Registration Cards (ARC) which contains a fingerprint of the individual that it has been issued to. The biometric ARC card is used to prevent an individual lodging multiple applications for asylum. Clause 2(4) of the Identity Cards Bill allows an entry for an individual to be made in the Register (whether or not he has applied to be, or is entitled to be entered in it) if the Secretary of State considers that the addition of the entry to the Register would be consistent with the statutory purposes. This clause will allow a failed asylum seeker to be entered into the Register to ensure that they cannot assume a different identity while they remain in the UK or if they make a subsequent attempt

3) Mr. Khan: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what mechanisms will be put in place to ensure the security of the National Identity Register. [4171]

Andy Burnham: In the interests of maintaining the security of the National Identity Register, it is not possible to reveal any proposed security mechanisms for the Scheme. However, the National Identity Register will be a highly secure system, and will be formally Security Accredited in accordance with Government policy. The policy can be found at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/cisa/publications/index.asp. The National Identity Register will also comply with the Data Protection Act and other relevant legislation.

The programme is working with acknowledged security specialists, Communication Electronic Security Group, National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre and other organisations to ensure appropriate measures are in place to maintain a secure and resilient system.

The Identity Cards Bill includes a clause which makes it a criminal offence to disclose information without lawful authority. This includes information relating to the Register, the issuing of ID Cards or the functions of the National Identity Scheme Commissioner. This is set out in clause 29 of the Bill. A person found guilty of an offence under this section is liable for up to two years imprisonment. A separate offence of tampering with the Register attracts a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment.

4) Mr. Khan: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what the penalty will be for those unwilling to pay the £1,000 civil penalty for not obtaining an identity card. [4139]

Mr. McNulty: Clause 6 of the Identity Cards Bill enables the Secretary of State to make an order imposing an obligation on individuals of a specified description to be entered in the Register. An individual could only be required to register once Parliament has agreed via a "super-affirmative" procedure to make registration compulsory. An individual who fails to register when required to do so under clause 6 will be liable to a civil penalty not exceeding £2,500.

Where an individual fails to satisfy his obligations under clause 6 subsections (2) and (3), he is liable for a further civil penalty not exceeding £2,500 in respect of each time the Secretary of State gives him notice requiring him to make an application and he fails to do so before the set deadline.

The Secretary of State must issue a code of practice setting out the matters that he will consider when determining the amount to be imposed by way of a civil penalty and before issuing the code, the Secretary of State must lay a draft of it before Parliament.

The Secretary of State must have regard to the code when imposing a civil penalty or considering a notice of objection under clause 34.

Clause 33 of the Bill sets out the requirements that apply to the Secretary of State when imposing a notice of a civil penalty. A person may object to the Secretary of State about the imposition of the civil penalty on the grounds that: he is not liable for it, that the circumstances of the contravention make the imposition of the penalty unreasonable or that the amount of the penalty is too high. This is set out in clause 34 of the Bill. A person may also appeal against the imposition of a civil penalty, as set out on clause 35 of the Bill, to the county court in England, Wales or Northern Ireland or to the Sheriff in Scotland.

In the case of non-payment of a civil penalty the Secretary of State will enforce the debt through the civil courts.

5) Mr. Khan: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what assessment he has made of the likely effects of identity cards on vulnerable groups in society. [4133]

Mr. McNulty: We are taking close consideration of the needs of vulnerable groups in designing the requirements for the identity cards system.

The Special Issues ID cards research conducted at the end of 2004 and the United Kingdom Passport Service biometric enrolment trial published in May 2005 have consulted a range of faith, race and nationality groups as well as stakeholders representing people with disabilities and disadvantaged groups (for example organisations representing blind people, deaf people, the elderly and physically and mentally disabled, transgender groups, Gypsies or the homeless).

Consultations with groups representing more vulnerable groups in society will continue to ensure that their requirements are fed into the design of the scheme.

6) Mr. Khan: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether there are plans to include (a) DNA and (b) medical records on the National Identity Register in the second stage of the identity cards process. [4172]

Mr. McNulty: The Identity Cards Scheme is not proposing to use DNA as one of the biometric identifiers. Clause 43 of the Identity Cards Bill defines biometric information as data about a person's external characteristics, e.g. facial image, iris pattern or fingerprints and therefore excludes DNA. DNA is not included in the list of information at Schedule one of the Identity Cards Bill that may be held on the National Identity Register and there is no power under Clause five of the Bill (applications relating to entries in the Register) for the Secretary of State to require a person to provide a DNA sample.

The Identity Cards Scheme is not proposing to include medical records on the National Identity Register. Clause one and Schedule one of the Identity
  
Cards Bill sets out what information could be held on the Register. In general the storage of medical information on the Register would not be allowed by the Bill as medical information does not fall within the definition of registerable facts as set out in Clause 1(5) of the Bill.

The Bill does allow for the storage of voluntary information with the consent of both the person who is registered and the Secretary of State.

7) Mr. Khan: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what assessment has been made of the likely impact of identity cards on (a) immigration control, (b) illegal working, (c) misuse of public services, (d) activities of organised criminals and (e) terrorism. [4143]

Mr. McNulty: The Identity Cards Bill Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA), published on 25 May 2005, outlines the assessed benefits of the identity cards scheme in section two. Benefits specifically relating to the categories mentioned in the question above are summarised below: The scheme will provide a straightforward means to record and verify the immigration status of all residents aged 16 and over. The verification service will be available not just to the authorities for maintaining immigration controls but also to employers to check status and entitlement to work. The scheme will reduce the opportunity for those facilitating terrorist and organised criminal activity to operate using multiple identities, encourage verifiable proof of identity when conducting major financial transactions, provide the capability—with independent oversight—for law enforcement and security agencies to be provided with information on when a person's record on the National Identity Register has been checked or amended, allow for the more efficient use of police resources and to check fingerprint biometric information at scenes of crime where no match can be found against existing police records. Public services will benefit from the ID cards scheme through improving the administration of social security benefits, eligibility checks for free non-emergency NHS treatment, adult allocation of the national insurance number; speeding up and improving the accuracy of Criminal Records Bureau checks and in more general ways through speeding up administrative processes.

8) Mr. Khan: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what assessment has been made of the pilot studies carried out for the identity cards scheme. [4141]

Mr. McNulty: The United Kingdom Passport Service (UKPS) biometric enrolment trial, carried out in collaboration with Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency, the Immigration and Nationality Directorate and the Identity Cards Programme team, is the only pilot study carried out for the identity cards scheme to date. The UKPS trial was not a trial of ID cards nor the technology involved, rather a test of the practicalities of enrolling people's biometrics and people's perceptions of that process. A great deal was learnt from the trial. We now know much more about the practicalities of biometric enrolment and issues that arise with enrolment on such a large scale. We also learned that people's perception of the process was very positive overall, with a post-trial reduction in those who had reported concerns about having their biometrics taken pre-trial and a majority reporting a better than expected level of intrusion at the process. The vast majority of participants found their expectations of the overall experience to have been met or bettered. The full results of the trial are available on the UKPS website http://www.ukpa.gov.uk/news/news.asp?intElement=986.

9) Mr. Khan: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what research his Department has (a) commissioned and (b) evaluated on the technology that will be used for identity cards; and if he will make a statement. [4144]

Mr. McNulty: Given the constant advancement of biometric technology and the need to conduct a fair and thorough procurement process, final decisions have not been taken about the technology that will be used for the Identity Cards scheme.

Rather than evaluate equipment at this time, much of which may be superseded by the time cards are first issued, we are working with other Government Departments and with expert advice to set the requirements for performance. We have engaged independent and Government advisers to work on the Identity Cards programme team and to provide advice with regard to technologies to be considered for use by the Identity Cards scheme. We are also applying the lessons learnt from the experience of other large scale technology implementation projects within the Home Office and across Government.

10) Mr. Khan: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what recent representations he has received on the likely impact of identity cards on civil liberties; and what response he has made. [4145]

Mr. McNulty: Since the publication of the Identity Cards Bill on 25 May 2005, 21 representations have been received from members of the public. No representations have been received from any organisations or official bodies. The representations took the form of both letters and e-mails, and they expressed concern that the Identity Card Scheme would infringe civil liberties.

The Government believe that the Identity Cards Scheme will support civil liberties and human rights. The scheme will be bound by legislation such as the Data Protection Act, Human Rights Act and the Disability Discrimination Act. The Identity Cards Bill also contains a number of important safeguards such as setting limitations on the information that may be held by the scheme and its use. Only Parliament would be able to change the statutory purposes of the Register or the type of information which could be held and only via primary legislation.
 

11) Mr. Khan: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he expects further primary legislation to be required to extend the use of the information stored on the National Identity Register in the second stage of the identity cards process. [4165]

Mr. McNulty: The scope of the legislation currently before Parliament is sufficient to ensure that the benefits of the scheme are realised without the need for further primary legislation.

12) Mr. Khan: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department when he expects the requirements for the National Identity Register to be finalised. [4131]

Mr. McNulty: Work is continuing to specify requirements for the National Identity Register. The procurement phase of the scheme cannot begin until the Identity Cards Bill currently before Parliament is passed. In line with procurement best practice, each requirement will be finalised before the procurement starts, but the details will be worked through with potential suppliers to ensure that the Government can take full advantage of innovation in the market place.

13) Mr. Khan: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what plans he has to audit the accuracy and efficiency of (a) biometric readings and (b) the National Identity Register. [4134]

Mr. McNulty: During procurement we will undertake carefully designed scientific tests of the performance of the biometric system. The overall verification and identification performance of the ID card system will be tested both during rollout of the technology and when the scheme is running, this will include the quality of data held on the National Identity Register. Primarily, individual cardholders will be encouraged to keep their record up-to-date in order to maintain the integrity and accuracy of the register. It is likely that the convenience of having a reliable method of verifying identity in everyday situations will encourage individuals to keep their details up to date, so they can access services in a secure and speedy manner. The proposed identity cards agency will seek to validate and verify new information provided as far as is practically possible. However, in addition, there is a power for the Secretary of State to require individuals to keep prescribed details up to date.

14) Mr. Khan: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what research his Department has conducted on systems to link identity card readers to the National Identity Register. [4135]

Mr. McNulty: The Identity Cards Programme has examined the viability, resilience, security, technical interoperability and practicality of various reader and network options. This includes remote authentication where the card-holder and the service provider are not present at the same location, Chip and PIN and checks for the purposes of border control. For example, the ID Cards Programme is working closely with the Association for Payment Clearing Services to examine the technical architecture underpinning Chip and PIN and to benefit from lessons learned during the rollout. The dialogue will help to develop considerations of where shared technical opportunities with the Chip and PIN infrastructure might exist in the future.
 

15) Mr. Khan: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will make a statement on the powers of the National Identity Cards Scheme Commissioner. [4140]

Mr. McNulty: The National Identity Scheme Commissioner's powers are set out in clause 24 of the Identity Cards Bill. The Commissioner will be responsible for overseeing the operation of the Act and any subordinate legislation. The Commissioner will also oversee the arrangements put in place for the purposes of fulfilling functions granted to the Secretary of State or designated documents authorities under the Act and the arrangements made by those people authorised to receive information from the register (for example how the information is used, what it is used for, how is it recorded), except in the cases which would fall within the jurisdiction of the Intelligence Services Commissioner as set out in clause 26. The Commissioner will also be able to oversee the uses to which identity cards are being put.

The Commissioner will report to the Secretary of State as soon as practicable after the end of each calendar year about the carrying out of the Commissioner's functions. The Commissioner may also at any other time make such report to the Secretary of State as he thinks fit. The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a copy of every report made to him by the Commissioner. This is set out in clause 25 of the Identity Cards Bill.

There is nothing in the Bill to constrain the National Identity Scheme Commissioner from working with any other Commissioner (for example the Information Commissioner or the Commission for Racial Equality) in order to oversee the National Identity Cards Scheme.

16) Mr. Khan: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will make a statement on how the information stored in the National Identity Register will be used. [4132]

Mr. McNulty: The information that may be held on the National Identity Register is strictly limited by the Bill. This is listed in schedule one of the Bill and includes personal information such as name address date and place of birth. Only Parliament would be able to change the information which could be held by the scheme. The purposes for which the register is established and maintained are confined to the statutory purposes which are clearly set out in clause one of the Bill.

Information held on the register will be used by public and private sector organisations with the consent of the individual for verification purposes. Clause 14 of the Identity Cards Bill limits the information that could be provided with consent, and under these provisions the whole of an individual's record could not be obtained.

An accreditation scheme will be established, so that only those private sector organisations that have been approved will be able to make checks on the National Identity Register on the validity of cards or the registered details.

There are also the required identity checks provision in clauses 15–19 of the Identity Cards Bill. Parliament will need to agree rules on a service by service basis including whether biometric information would form part of the identity check.

Clauses 19–23 of the Identity Cards Bill set out the how information may be provided without the consent of the individual. The organisations to whom this information may be provided are listed on the face of the Bill, namely: the Security and Intelligence Agencies, the Serious and Organised Crime Agency, Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs and the police. Parliament must agree the rules under which such information would be provided without consent. The whole of a person's record may be provided to the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service, GCHQ and the Serious and Organised Crime Agency provided it is for the purpose of the carrying out of their functions. The police, Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs and Government Departments, including Northern Ireland Departments which have been specifically approved by Parliament, may only be provided with the whole of an individual's record for purposes connected with the prevention or detection of serious crime. Any other public authorities approved by Parliament to be provided with information without consent, may be provided with such information for purposes connected with the carrying out of any prescribed functions of that department, or of a Minister in charge of it. These public authorities cannot be provided with the whole of a person's record, as under the provisions of clause 22, they cannot be provided with information listed in paragraph nine, schedule one of the Bill.

The Bill ensures that provision of information without consent will be properly regulated and subject to independent oversight.

17) Mr. Khan: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what the cost will be for individuals who need to amend their details on the National Identity Register. [4138]

Mr. McNulty: The Identity Cards Bill provides powers to the Secretary of State to set fees in respect of functions that are carried out under this Act. This is outlined in clause 37 of the Bill. However no decisions have been taken on the fee structure and Parliament will have the final say on the regulations to impose fees, as set out in clause 37(4) of the Bill.

18) Mr. Khan: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what he expects the cost to be for replacement of lost identity cards. [4136]

Mr. McNulty: No decisions have yet been made about the cost to the individual of replacing a lost ID card. The current best estimate of the average annual operating costs of issuing biometric passports and ID cards of £584 million which was published in the regulatory impact assessment on 25 May 2005 includes an allowance for the replacement of lost, stolen and damaged cards.

19) Mr. Khan: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what research he has evaluated on the impact of identity cards on tackling crime in countries which have identity cards. [4167]

Andy Burnham: Most countries with identity cards have had schemes in place for many years and they are therefore not in a position to evaluate the impact they have on crime. However, it is clear that schemes in other countries do help in the fight against crime, for example the Spanish police have stated that identifying nearly all of the terrorists involved in the Madrid bombings was made significantly easier by their identity cards scheme. Identity cards were also used to identify the victims of the bombings quickly.

Biometrics are being used to more strongly tie a verified identity to an individual. In this way, biometrics can be used along with an ID card to verify that identity against the record held for that card. Other forms of authentication, such as PIN numbers and passwords can be stolen along with a card so are much weaker at linking a person to an identity.

All the Schengen states will be required to use biometrics in passports under Council Regulation 2252/2004. Fingerprint biometrics (rather than just fingerprints) will be introduced within three years of adoption. Non- Schengen states may choose to follow the requirements, although they would not be bound by the timetable.

Other EU member states which issue identity cards are considering introducing biometrics to increase security and some, for example Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, already collect one of more fingerprints as part of their national identity card schemes.

20) Mr. Khan: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether the identity cards scheme has been subject to a Gateway Review. [27898]

Andy Burnham: The Identity Cards Programme has been through a Gateway zero Review in January 2004 and Gateway one Review in July 2005. The next Gateway Review is currently planned for early 2006.

21) To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what representations he has received on the arrangements for identity cardholders to register a change of address; and if he will make a statement.  (27479)

Andy Burnham: The Identity Cards Programme Team has received a total of four letters from members of the public which mentioned updating address details on the National Identity Register. These letters were received between December 2004 and October 2005. These letters asked for clarification on the process for updating addresses on the Register and inquired whether there would be a charge for amending their record in this way.It is intended that updates of addresses will be both easy and secure. There will be a variety of methods to update addresses on the National Identity Register. This could include over the internet, by telephone or in writing but in each case, in order to protect individuals from bogus attempts to change their address details, there would need to be a validation of identity. The Identity Cards Programme is currently investigating the most secure method of conducting such “remotely conducted” transactions, including the use of new methods involving one-time passwords, which would provide much greater assurance than traditional methods.

22) Mr. Khan: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what assessment he has made of the likely impact of the identity cards scheme in helping to tackle online fraud. [27473]

Andy Burnham: Through the use of remote authentication technologies, there is an opportunity for the identity card scheme to combat online fraud. Currently , the identity cards programme is looking at various alternatives that allow the implementation of secure remote authentication including use of one-time password technology. These technologies offer a mechanism to obtain greater assurance of the identity of individuals during internet transactions.

Work is continuing with representative groups from both private and public sectors to assess how these technologies might be used to supplement existing procedures in practice. However, no final decisions regarding these options have been taken. As a result, no quantifiable benefits connected with online fraud have, as yet, been claimed with the scheme's benefits case.

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